The Many Faces of Strategic Voting : Tactical Behavior in Electoral Systems Around the World / edited by Laura B. Stephenson, John H. Aldrich, and André Blais.

Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Book collections on Project MUSEPublisher: Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, 2018Manufacturer: Baltimore, Md. : Project MUSE, 2019Copyright date: ©2018Description: 1 online resource (252 pages)Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9780472901128
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Online resources:
Contents:
Strategic voting and political institutions / John H. Aldrich, Andre Blais, and Laura B. Stephenson -- The effect of national and constituency expectations on tactical voting in the British general election of 2010 / Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, Abraham Diskin, Aaron M. Houck, Renan Levine, Thomas J. Scotto, and David B. Sparks -- Strategic voting in changing times: the 2016 election in Spain / Ignacio Lago -- Support for minority government and strategic voting / Jean-François Daoust -- Information on party strength and strategic voting: evidence of non-effects from a randomized experiment / Andre Blais, Peter Loewen, Daniel Rubenson, Laura B. Stephenson, and Elisabeth Gidengil -- Expected electoral performance, candidate quality, and voter strategic coordination: the case of Japan / Carolina Plescia -- Strategic coalition voting in Belgium: the 2014 federal and regional elections / Tom Verthe and Stefanie Beyens -- Voting strategically in two-vote elections / Philipp Harfst, Andre Blais, and Damien Bol -- Strategic voting in multiwinner elections with approval balloting: an application to the 2011 regional government election in Zurich / Karine Van der Straeten, Romain Lachat, and Jean-François Laslier -- Sincere voting, strategic voting: a laboratory experiment using alternative proportional systems / Isabelle Lebon, Antoinette Baujard, Frederic Gavrel, Herrade Igersheim, and Jean-François Laslier.
Summary: "Strategic voting is classically defined as "voting for one's second preferred option to prevent one's least preferred option from winning when one's first preference has no chance." Voters want their votes to be effective, and casting a ballot that will have no influence on an election is undesirable--therefore, some voters cast a strategic ballot when they decide it is useful. This edited volume includes case studies of strategic voting behavior in Israel, Germany, Japan, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland, Canada, and the UK, and provides a conceptual framework for understanding strategic voting behavior in all types of electoral systems. The classic definition explicitly considers strategic voting in a single race with a single winner, which has at least three candidates. This situation is more common in electoral systems that have single member districts that employ plurality or majoritarian electoral rules and have multiparty systems. Indeed, much of the literature on strategic voting to date has considered systems like those in Canada and the United Kingdom. This book contributes to a more general understanding of strategic voting behavior by taking into account a wide variety of institutional contexts, such as single transferable vote rules, proportional representation, two round and mixed electoral systems"-- Provided by publisher
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Strategic voting and political institutions / John H. Aldrich, Andre Blais, and Laura B. Stephenson -- The effect of national and constituency expectations on tactical voting in the British general election of 2010 / Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, Abraham Diskin, Aaron M. Houck, Renan Levine, Thomas J. Scotto, and David B. Sparks -- Strategic voting in changing times: the 2016 election in Spain / Ignacio Lago -- Support for minority government and strategic voting / Jean-François Daoust -- Information on party strength and strategic voting: evidence of non-effects from a randomized experiment / Andre Blais, Peter Loewen, Daniel Rubenson, Laura B. Stephenson, and Elisabeth Gidengil -- Expected electoral performance, candidate quality, and voter strategic coordination: the case of Japan / Carolina Plescia -- Strategic coalition voting in Belgium: the 2014 federal and regional elections / Tom Verthe and Stefanie Beyens -- Voting strategically in two-vote elections / Philipp Harfst, Andre Blais, and Damien Bol -- Strategic voting in multiwinner elections with approval balloting: an application to the 2011 regional government election in Zurich / Karine Van der Straeten, Romain Lachat, and Jean-François Laslier -- Sincere voting, strategic voting: a laboratory experiment using alternative proportional systems / Isabelle Lebon, Antoinette Baujard, Frederic Gavrel, Herrade Igersheim, and Jean-François Laslier.

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"Strategic voting is classically defined as "voting for one's second preferred option to prevent one's least preferred option from winning when one's first preference has no chance." Voters want their votes to be effective, and casting a ballot that will have no influence on an election is undesirable--therefore, some voters cast a strategic ballot when they decide it is useful. This edited volume includes case studies of strategic voting behavior in Israel, Germany, Japan, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland, Canada, and the UK, and provides a conceptual framework for understanding strategic voting behavior in all types of electoral systems. The classic definition explicitly considers strategic voting in a single race with a single winner, which has at least three candidates. This situation is more common in electoral systems that have single member districts that employ plurality or majoritarian electoral rules and have multiparty systems. Indeed, much of the literature on strategic voting to date has considered systems like those in Canada and the United Kingdom. This book contributes to a more general understanding of strategic voting behavior by taking into account a wide variety of institutional contexts, such as single transferable vote rules, proportional representation, two round and mixed electoral systems"-- Provided by publisher

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