Common Law Judging : Subjectivity, Impartiality, and the Making of Law / Douglas E. Edlin.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextSeries: Book collections on Project MUSEPublisher: Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press, [2016]Manufacturer: Baltimore, Md. : Project MUSE, 2016Copyright date: ©[2016]Description: 1 online resource (312 pages)Content type:
  • text
Media type:
  • computer
Carrier type:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9780472122158
Subject(s): Genre/Form: Online resources:
Contents:
Introduction -- Subjectivity, objectivity, impartiality -- Subjectivity and intersubjectivity -- Making law -- Judicial individualism and judicial independence -- Conclusion.
Summary: Are judges supposed to be objective? Citizens, scholars, and legal professionals commonly assume that subjectivity and objectivity are opposites, with the corollary that subjectivity is a vice and objectivity is a virtue. These assumptions underlie passionate debates over adherence to original intent and judicial activism. Douglas Edlin challenges these widely held assumptions by reorienting the entire discussion. Rather than analyze judging in terms of objectivity and truth, he argues that we should instead approach the role of a judge's individual perspective in terms of intersubjectivity and validity. Drawing upon Kantian aesthetic theory as well as case law, legal theory, and constitutional theory, Edlin develops a new conceptual framework for the respective roles of the individual judge and of the judiciary as an institution, as well as the relationship between them, as integral parts of the broader legal and political community.
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Introduction -- Subjectivity, objectivity, impartiality -- Subjectivity and intersubjectivity -- Making law -- Judicial individualism and judicial independence -- Conclusion.

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Are judges supposed to be objective? Citizens, scholars, and legal professionals commonly assume that subjectivity and objectivity are opposites, with the corollary that subjectivity is a vice and objectivity is a virtue. These assumptions underlie passionate debates over adherence to original intent and judicial activism. Douglas Edlin challenges these widely held assumptions by reorienting the entire discussion. Rather than analyze judging in terms of objectivity and truth, he argues that we should instead approach the role of a judge's individual perspective in terms of intersubjectivity and validity. Drawing upon Kantian aesthetic theory as well as case law, legal theory, and constitutional theory, Edlin develops a new conceptual framework for the respective roles of the individual judge and of the judiciary as an institution, as well as the relationship between them, as integral parts of the broader legal and political community.

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